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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between remittances and economic 
growth. Additionally, it examines whether the size of the informal economy alter negatively the 
effect of remittances on economic growth, which surprisingly has received less attention in the 
literature. The paper applied the Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) and system Generalized 
Method of Moment (GMM) by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). The 
sample include 30 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over 1991-2015. The results show 
that: first, remittances have a positive and significant effect on economic growth. Second, the 
impact of remittances on economic growth decreases with the size of the informal economy.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to investigate the effect of remittances on economy growth. It additionally 
examines the relevance of the informal economy on the relationship between remittances and 
economic growth in 30 sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1991-2015. Using 
Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) and System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), results 
show that remittances affect positively and significantly economic growth and that the impact 
of remittances on economic growth decreases with the size of informal economy. 
In the recent times, economists and policy makers considered international remittances as an 
important contributor to economic growth such as capital (Njangang et al., 2018). Developing 
countries, and particularly Sub-Saharan African countries have been experiencing rapid 
expansion of migrant remittances in the last decades, far exceeding the official development 
assistance received and other private capital inflows in many countries (Fig 1). According to 
the World Bank (2017), officially, recorded remittances to developing countries is estimated to 
US$ 442 billion in 2017. On the other hand, remittances to sub Saharan African countries 
increased from US$29.9 billion in 2010 to an estimated US$37.8 billion in 2017 and are forecast 
to hit around US$39.2 billion in 2018 and US$39.6 billion in 2019. Although this amount seems 
lower compared to other regions (East Asia with US$128 billion, South Asia with US$111.6 
billion and MENA region with US$51.2 in 2017), it does not take into account remittances 
transferred through informal channels, such as friends and family members travelling abroad, 
or informal money-transfer networks such as the “hawala” system.  
Despite their increased importance and volume, the impact of remittances on economic 
growth is still an unresolved puzzle. Some studies in this literature found that remittances have 
a positive impact on economic growth in the recipient countries (Nyamongo et al., 2012; Nsiah 
and Fayissa, 2013; Olubiyi, 2014; Meyer and Shera, 2017), while others found no such evidence 
(Ahamada and Coulibaly, 2013) and somewhat a negative impact (Chami et al., 2003; Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo, 2004; Acosta et al., 2009; Elu and Price, 2012) on economic growth. At the 
crossroads of these two opposing groups, there is a third group of researchers who consider the 
indirect effects of remittances on economic growth. Indeed, it has been shown in the literature 
that remittances can influence economic growth through several channels such as growth 
volatility (Hnatkovska and Loayza, 2004), Exchange rates (Lopez et al., 2007; Lartey et al., 
2008), human capital formation (Yang, 2008; Calero et al., 2009 and Adams and Cuecuecha, 
2010), investment (Woodruff  and Zenteno, 2007) and financial development (Giuliano and 
Ruiz–Arranz, 2009; Nyamongo et al., 2012; Kumar et al., 2018). This study is related to this 
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third group of researchers and investigates the relevance of the size of the informal economy 
on the relation between remittances and economic growth in Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Although a large part of the remittances literature focuses on the remittances–growth 
relationship in both developing and developed countries, to the best of our knowledge, there 
are no studies that focus specifically on the role of the size of the informal economy on the link 
between remittances and economic growth. As we know that developing countries, and 
particularly Sub-Saharan African countries are characterised by a large informal sector, a large 
informal economy might alter the effect of remittances on economic growth. Moreover, the 
informal economy has proved to be a major obstacle of development in developing countries 
where as much as 75% of production takes places underground (compared to only  around  10%  
in   developed   countries)   (Schneider   and   Enste,  2000).  Our  goal  is  to  bridge  this  gap  by  
analysing the relevance of the size of the informal economy in the relationship between 
remittances and economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Figure 1: Remittances, foreign aid and FDI, 1980-2016.  
 
Source: World Development Indicator (2017) and authors’ calculations. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature reviews. 
Section 3 lays out the data, the empirical mode, and the estimation strategy. Section 4 presents 
and analyses the results. Section 5 concludes with policy implications. 
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2. Brief literature reviews 
The relationship between remittances and economic growth has been widely examined in the 
literature (Chami et al., 2008; Pradhan et al., 2008; Rao and Hassan, 2011; Cooray, 2012; Feeny 
et al., 2013). The question that researchers are trying to answer is whether and to what extent 
remittances contribute to economic development. Nevertheless, empirical studies have shown 
inconsistent and even contradictory results in terms of the link between remittances and 
economic growth. The enormous and growing literature on this subject can be categorized under 
two main strands. The first strand supports the optimistic view that remittances have a positive 
impact on economic growth, while the second strand contradicts the previous views and argues 
that remittances can be detrimental for economic growth. 
Several studies have reported evidence that remittances have a positive and significant 
effects on economic growth through their positive impact on consumption, savings, or 
investment. Meyer and Shera (2017) and Goschin (2013) show that remittances contribute 
positively to economic growth. Based on a sample of six high remittances receiving countries, 
namely, Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Moldava, Romania and Bosnia Herzegovina, Meyer 
and Shera (2017) estimate a standard growth model and find that remittances have a positive 
impact on economic growth and that this impact increases at higher levels of remittances 
relative to GDP. Similarly, Nsiah and Fayissa (2013) investigate the relationship between 
remittances and economic growth in a panel of 64 different countries of Africa, Asian and Latin 
American- Caribbean from 1987-2007. By using panel full modified least square estimator, 
they found that there is positive and significant relationship between remittances and economic 
growth throughout the whole group. Nyamongo et al. (2012) investigate the role of remittances 
and financial development on economic growth in a panel of 36 countries in Africa over the 
period 1980–2009. They found that remittances are an important source of growth for these 
countries during the study period.  Moreover, remittances represent a source of savings and thus 
provide additional capital for investment in Health, education and entrepreneurship (Rao and 
Hassan, 2011; Anton, 2010; Yang, 2008; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007), all of which have a 
significant effect on productivity, employment and finally on economic growth. Recently, 
Williams (2018) investigated the effect of remittances on a large panel of 109 developing 
countries and found that remittances promote growth in countries with good quality of 
democratic institutions. The positive growth effect of remittances is confirmed in several other 
studies (Olubiyi, 2014).  
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Other studies have pointed out negative or insignificant effects of remittances on economic 
growth. According to Gupta et al. (2007), remittances are neither a panacea nor a substitute for 
a sustained and domestically engineered development endeavor for curing the problem of low- 
income countries. Based on that, remittances can appreciate the real exchange rate in the host 
economies and therefore generate a resource allocation from the tradable to the non-tradable 
sector (Acosta et al., 2009; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004). Moreover, a large part of 
remittances received in less developed countries are spent on consumption likely to be 
dominated by foreign goods rather than productivity improving spending. Therefore these 
remittances undermine productivity and growth (Ahlburg, 1991). Additionally, some authors 
argue that remittances may reduce recipients’ motivation to work, creating permanent financial 
dependency, and slowing down economic growth (Chami et al., 2003). For Elu and Price 
(2012), remittances can be used to finance terrorism, therefore inhibiting economic growth. 
Other studies have found a non-significant effects of remittances on economic growth. 
Ahamada and Coulibaly (2013) applied a panel Granger causality testing approach that is based 
on seemingly unrelated regressions systems and Wald tests with country-specific bootstrap 
critical values on 20 Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1980–2007. They found 
that in any Sub-Saharan African country, there is no causality between remittances and growth. 
The reason is that remittances do not increase physical capital investment. Several others studies 
have reported a negative or insignificant effects of remittances on economic growth (Roa and 
Hassan, 2011; Le, 2009). 
3. Data and methodology 
The empirical approach is designed to assess the role of the size of the informal economy in the 
relationship between remittances and economic growth in Sub-Saharan African countries. In 
this section our data is described (section 3.1), model specification is presented (section 3.2) 
and the estimation strategy is discussed (section 3.3). 
3.1.Data 
We investigate a panel of 30 Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1991-2015 with 
data from different sources. The choice of the selected countries and periodicity for this study 
are  primarily  dictated  by  the  availability  of  reliable  data.  In  line  with  the  empirical  growth  
literature, the dataset is average over five-year period to validate the methodology used. More 
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precisely, the dataset is divided into five non overlapping five-year intervals: 1991-1995; 1996-
2000; 2001-2005; 2006-2010 and 2011-2015. The full description of the data is as follows: 
The dependent variable is economic growth measured by the GDP per capita growth. This 
variable is obtained directly from the World Bank: African Development indicators. Our main 
independent variables are remittances received as a percentage of GDP and  the size  of  the  
informal economy (or shadow  economy)  as  a  percentage  of  GDP. The size of the informal 
economy is obtained from Medina and Schneider (2017). These authors applied the Multiple 
Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) modelling approach to estimate the size of the informal 
economy  as  a  percentage  of  GDP.  Remittances  received  is  gathered  from  the  World  Bank:  
African Development indicators. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics, 5 year-average for the period 1991-2015. 
Variable Obs Mean S.D Minimum Maximum 
Remittances 150 .1951417 1.595904 -4.044901 3.45031 
Informal economy 150 3.647377 .2404783 2.956471 4.204693 
GDP per capita growth 150 6.894765 .9650817 5.289112 9.342908 
Population growth 150 2.68096 .6407887 .7072151 6.127723 
Inflation rate 147 3.803759 .4550685 .5659054 6.479244 
Trade openness 150 4.175024 .4000912 2.94973 5.371137 
Financial development 150 3.258088 .4843104 2.212731 5.703973 
Government expenditure 150 2.603425 .3593497 1.521541 3.660246 
Human capital 150 4.527339 .2667194 3.394354 5.003238 
Labor force participation 150 4.213145 .1720849 3.843616 4.480068 
corruption 150 2.142611 .7750722 0 4.333334 
Government stability 150 8.235278 1.282659 5.91667 10.99166 
S.D: Standard Deviation  
 
Next to the informal economy variable, we include nine control variables, generally 
considered  in  the  literature  as  determinants  of  economic  growth:  (i)  Population  growth;  (ii)  
Inflation rate; (iii) Trade openness; (iv) financial development (M2); (v) Government 
expenditure; (vi) Human Capital; (vii) Labor force participation; (viii) Corruption control and  
(ix) Government stability. Table 1 and 2 present the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
of the variable employed in the analysis respectively. It is apparent  from  the summary  statistics  
that  the  variables  are  comparable  from  the  perspective of mean values. Corresponding 
standard deviations show substantial variations. Therefore, we can be confident that reasonable 
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estimated nexuses would be obtained from the regressions. Moreover, we notice from 
correlation matrix that, while remittances and economic growth are positively correlated, the 
correlation between the informal economy and economic growth is negative. However, since 
correlation does not mean causality, this correlation will be verified by empirical analysis. The 
Definition of variables and list of countries are given in appendix. All variables are in log 
transformed, except corruption and government stability. 
Table 2 : Correlation matrix 
  Remit  IS GDPPg PopG Inflation Trade M2 Govex HK Laborforce corruption govstab 
Remit  1.0000            
IS 0.1564 1.0000           
GDPPg 0.0857 -0.1236 1.0000          
PopG 0.1024 0.0096 0.1580 1.0000         
Inflation -0.1690 0.2398 -0.2056 -0.1174 1.0000        
Trade -0.1203 -0.0915 -0.0343 -0.0648 0.0659 1.0000       
FinDev 0.0657 -0.0708 0.0688 -0.2437 0.0192 0.3465 1.0000      
Govex -0.2276 -0.0974 0.0126 -0.0318 0.0453 0.4377 0.3581 1.0000     
HK -0.2164 -0.1829 -0.0138 -0.1531 -0.0250 0.4376 0.2537 0.0649 1.0000    
Laborforce -0.0787 0.3036 0.0537 0.2119 0.1652 0.0436 0.0183 0.1222 0.0082 1.0000   
Corruption -0.1866 0.0814 -0.1167 0.0348 0.0115 0.1076 0.0527 0.2865 0.0306 0.1079 1.0000  
Govstab 0.0068 -0.1773 0.3191 0.0627 -0.2493 0.2827 0.0306 0.0946 0.2202 -0.0848 -0.0654 1.0000 
Note. Remit : remittances. IS: the size of the informal economy. GDPPg : GDP per capita growth. PopG : population growth rate. M2: 
financial development. Trade: trade openness. Govex : government expenditure. HK : human capital. Laborforce : labor force participation. 
Govstab : government stability. 
 
3.2.Model specification 
To investigate the relationship between remittances, the informal economy and economic 
growth, we divide the sample period 1991–2015 into 5 non-overlapping 5-year periods to avoid 
the  influence  of  idiosyncratic  economic  dynamics  at  business  cycle  frequency,  as  well  as  to  
control for cyclical output movements. As a starting exercise, we estimate the impact of 
remittances on economic growth without introducing in our first regression the informal 
economy variable. For this purpose, the empirical model is based on Lartey (2013); Adams and 
Klobodu (2016) and Zghidi et al. (2018). Following these studies, we estimate the following 
equation: 
݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜௧ = ݃݀݌௜௧ െ ݃݀݌௜௧ିଵ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ݃݀݌௜௧ିଵ + ߚଶܴ݁݉݅ݐݐܽ݊ܿ݁ݏ௜௧ + ߚଷܺ௜௧ + ߤ௜                           +ݒ௧ + ߝ௜௧                                                                                                     (1) 
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Where ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜௧ equals the growth rate of GDP per capita, ݃݀݌௜௧ is the logarithm of GDP per 
capita growth, ܴ݁݉݅ݐݐܽ݊ܿ݁ݏ௜௧ is  equal  to  remittances  over  GDP,  ௜ܺ௧ represents a vector of 
conditioning information that controls for other factors associated with economic growth, ߤ௜  is 
an unobserved country-specific effect, ݒ௧  is time specific effect and ߝ௜௧  is the error term.  
Beyond the direct impact of remittances on economic growth described in equation (1), the 
growth effect of remittances can occur through indirect channels. As mentioned above, this 
paper investigates the role of the size of the informal economy in the relationship between 
remittances and economic growth. For this purpose, we interact remittances with the size of the 
informal economy variable and test for the significance of the interacted coefficient. The 
specification of the equation is the following: 
 
݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ݃݀݌௜௧ିଵ + ߚଶܴ݁݉݅ݐݐܽ݊ܿ݁ݏ௜௧ + ߚଷ(ܴ݁݉݅ݐݐܽ݊ܿ݁ݏ௜௧uܫ݂݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ௜௧)                          +ߚସܫ݂݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ௜௧ +ߚହܺ௜௧ + ߤ௜ + ݒ௧ + ߝ௜௧                                                (2) 
Where  ܫ݂݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ௜௧  is the informal economy, (ܴ݁݉݅ݐݐܽ݊ܿ݁ݏ௜௧uܫ݂݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ௜௧) is the 
interaction term between remittances and the informal economy. To test the hypothesis 
explained above, we are interested in 2E   and 3E  , which provide information on the marginal 
effect of remittances on economic growth according to the size of the informal economy. A 
negative coefficient of interaction between remittances and the informal economy would imply 
that the marginal impact of remittances on growth is decreasing with the size of the informal 
economy. On the other hand, a positive interaction would indicate that the growth effects of 
remittances are enhanced by the informal economy. 
 
3.3.Estimation strategy 
To investigate the relationship between remittances, the informal economy and economic 
growth, a panel data models for five non overlapping five-year intervals are estimated from 
1991 to 2015. Our benchmark model (Eq.1) is estimated with two different panel methods, 
namely, the Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). We 
first use the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator to estimation Equation (1). However, when 
the OLS technique is used to estimate this model, the estimated coefficients are inconsistent 
and likely to be biased since the lagged value of GDP is positively correlated with the omitted 
fixed effects. Moreover, due to the fact that there is a possibility that both remittances and 
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growth are endogeneous, to estimate Equation (1) we apply the System Generalized method of 
moment (GMM)  proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). GMM is useful for several advantages. First, GMM estimator has 
been widely used to address the endogeneity problem that appears in panel data estimation of 
growth regressions (Arellano and Bover, 1995 and Blundell and Bond, 1998). Second, GMM 
estimator also take into account the biases that appear due to country-specific effects or the 
presence of the initial GDP in the growth’s covariates. Third, GMM also avoids simultaneity 
or reverse causality problems. The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on two things: 
the validity of the assumption that the error term does not exhibit serial correlation (AR2) and 
the validity of the instruments (Hansen test). 
GMM method have two variant namely, the one-step estimators and two-step estimators. 
However, the two-step estimator has been proved to be more efficient than the one-step 
estimator because it uses optimal weighting matrices (Law et al., 2017). Therefore, this paper 
applies the two-step system GMM. The use of two-step estimator to a small cross-section 
dimension may lead to biased standard errors. To correct this bias, the Arellano and Bover 
(1995) extension by Roodman (2009a, 2009b) is applied. This estimation strategy uses forward 
orthogonal deviations in place of first differences. GMM with forward orthogonal deviation has 
been proved to account for cross sectional dependence and to limit instruments proliferation 
(Balgati, 2008). 
 
4. Empirical results 
In this section, we present results obtained from the estimations. The baseline estimations is 
carried out using OLS and system GMM. Analysis will primarily start with the simplest version 
of the model by investigating if remittances promote economic growth. All variables have been 
converted into logarithmic form for the empirical estimation with the exception of the 
institutional variable (corruption and government stability). Coefficients are thus interpreted as 
elasticity. Results are presented in Table 3-6. Table 3 presents OLS and System GMM results 
of the impact of remittances on economic growth. Table 4 replicates the results presented in 
Table 3 with more control variables. The interaction effect of remittances and the size of the 
informal economy on economic growth is reported in Table 5. The estimation regressions 
satisfy mutually the Hansen test of the validity of instruments and the serial correlation test (AR 
(2)). 
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Table 3: Baseline model: Impact of Remittances on economic growth 
  Dependent variable : GDP per capita growth 
 OLS   GMM 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Remittances 0.289*** 0.283*** 0.272***  0.0522*** 0.0432*** 0.0404*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0370) (0.0380)  (0.0117) (0.00636) (0.0103) 
Population growth -0.624*** -0.625*** -0.611***  -0.00266 -0.00246 -0.00526 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.110)  (0.0221) (0.0215) (0.0212) 
Inflation rate -0.216 -0.211 -0.198  -0.0983*** -0.0850*** -0.105*** 
 (0.131) (0.132) (0.132)  (0.0177) (0.0108) (0.0172) 
Trade openness 0.433*** 0.399** 0.312*  0.0914*** 0.0666** 0.0560 
 (0.157) (0.166) (0.181)  (0.0291) (0.0270) (0.0365) 
Financial development 0.253* 0.225 0.199  0.0176 0.0305*** 0.0170 
 (0.138) (0.145) (0.146)  (0.0108) (0.00505) (0.0111) 
Government expenditure  0.125 0.176   0.0558 0.0177 
  (0.195) (0.200)   (0.0406) (0.0378) 
Human capital   0.308    0.166* 
   (0.255)    (0.0832) 
L.(GDP per capita growth)    0.935*** 0.963*** 0.952*** 
     (0.0339) (0.0240) (0.0337) 
Constant 6.790*** 6.683*** 5.514***  7.653* 8.019** 8.924** 
 (0.900) (0.917) (1.333)  (3.902) (3.837) (3.754) 
R-squared 0.488 0.489 0.494     
Observations 147 147 147  119 119 119 
Instruments     26 28 28 
Number of countries     30 30 30 
AR(1) test     0.0620 0.0688 0.0603 
AR(2) test     0.288 0.255 0.248 
Hansen OIR         0.238 0.368 0.764 
Note. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
4.1.Baseline estimators 
Table  3  reports  OLS  and  System  GMM  results  of  the  impact  of  remittances  on  economic  
growth.  Results  shows  that  remittances  have  a  positive  and  strongly  significant  effect  on  
economic growth. These results suggest that remittances on itself promote economic growth in 
our sample of countries. For example results in column (3) and (6) suggest that a 1 percent 
increase in remittances increases economic growth by 0.272% and 0.0404% respectively for 
OLS and System GMM estimators.  These results can be explained by the fact that remittances 
are seen as an important sources of savings, consumption for some countries, improving 
education and health access, providing African countries access to capital for investment and 
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thus lead to more economic growth. This result is consistent with several past studies on 
remittances - growth nexus (World Bank, 2006; Mundaca, 2009; Nyamongo et al., 2012; Kumar 
et al., 2018). For the independent variables population growth and inflation, we get a negative 
sign suggesting that the higher growth rate of population and inflation rate in a country, the 
lower is the rate of economic growth. The coefficients associated with the independent variable 
trade openness and human capital have the theoretically expected positive sign and the sign is 
highly statistically significant (for trade openness), implying that the higher the trade with 
foreign countries, the higher the rate of economic growth. The coefficient on government 
expenditure is positive but non- significant. 
4.2.Accounting for other factors that may inÀuence economic growth 
We confront our baseline results in terms of alternative explanations for our model. For this 
purpose, we evaluate our results by including more control variables, namely: Labor force 
participation rate, corruption control and government stability. Table 4 presents OLS and 
System GMM results of the impact of remittances on economic growth with these additional 
control variables. Results reinforce our previous findings in Table 3. These results confirm that 
the effect of remittances on economic growth is positive and statistically significant. Results in 
Column (2) and (5) show that a 1 percent increase in remittances leads to 0.286% and 0.0622% 
increase in economic growth respectively for OLS and GMM estimation methods.  
4.3.Interaction effect of remittances and the informal economy on economic growth 
Beyond the direct impact of remittances on economic growth presented in Table 3-4, the growth 
effect of remittances can occur through indirect channels. As mentioned above, this paper 
investigates the role of the informal economy on the relationship between remittances and 
economic growth. For this purpose, we interact remittances with the informal economy variable 
(Remittances*Informal economy) and test for the significance of the interacted coefficient. The 
sign of the interacted coefficient provides information regarding the nature of remittances. More 
specifically, a positive interaction term reveals that they are complementary and that a large 
size of the shadow economy enhances the impact of remittances on economic growth. On the 
other hand, a negative sign indicates that the shadow economy decreases the positive effect of 
remittances on economic growth. Table 5 (columns 2 and 4) presents OLS and system GMM 
estimates. Our analysis focus on the System GMM specification. Results show that the 
coefficient associated with (Remittances*Informal economy) is negative and statistically 
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significant, which indicates that the impact of remittances on economic growth decreases 
significantly with the size of the informal economy. This result  suggests that  if  Sub-Saharan 
African countries want to fully benefit from the economic outcomes of migrant remittances, 
they must put in place policies to encourage the transition from the informal sector to the formal 
sector. 
Table 4: estimation with more control variables 
  Dependent variable : GDP per capita growth 
 OLS   GMM 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Remittances 0.282*** 0.286*** 0.284***  0.0439*** 0.0622*** 0.0358*** 
 (0.0289) (0.0291) (0.0294)  (0.0107) (0.0165) (0.0123) 
Population growth -0.327*** -0.338*** -0.327***  -0.0128 -0.0514** -0.0409* 
 (0.0882) (0.0886) (0.0884)  (0.0175) (0.0242) (0.0226) 
Inflation rate -0.0342 -0.0464** -0.0164  -0.0882*** -0.0731** -0.0383** 
 (0.103) (0.0184) (0.0209)  (0.0143) (0.0314) (0.0145) 
Trade openness 0.828*** 0.636*** 0.596***  0.0674** 0.0890*** 0.0861*** 
 (0.179) (0.183) (0.171)  (0.0300) (0.0269) (0.0222) 
Financial development 0.263** 0.253** 0.256**  0.0598* 0.0500*** 0.0480* 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.114)  (0.0343) (0.0138) (0.0272) 
Government expenditure 0.364** 0.386** 0.369**  0.000448 0.0645 0.111** 
 (0.153) (0.154) (0.154)  (0.0471) (0.0662) (0.0503) 
Human capital 0.482** 0.494** 0.479**  0.249*** 0.00935 0.0828 
 (0.195) (0.195) (0.196)  (0.0675) (0.118) (0.113) 
Labor force participation -0.155 -0.216* -0.196  -0.3351** -0.3516* -0.1000** 
 (0.100) (0.127) (0.127)  (0.122) (0.202) (0.0465) 
Corruption Control  0.0703    0.0583**  
  (0.0612)    (0.0231)  
Government stability   0.0118    0.0116 
   (0.0378)    (0.00924) 
L.(GDP per capita growth)    0.960*** 0.950*** 0.944*** 
     (0.0340) (0.0299) (0.0278) 
Constant 14.59*** 14.55*** 14.72***  8.924** 8.809*** 7.585** 
 (1.355) (1.353) (1.418)  (3.754) (3.032) (3.820) 
R-squared 0.710 0.712 0.710     
Observations 147 147 147  119 119 119 
Instruments     26 29 29 
Number of countries     30 30 30 
AR(1) test     0.0587 0.0884 0.0606 
AR(2) test     0.286 0.168 0.977 
Hansen OIR         0.783 0.965 0.924 
Note. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Consistent with previous studies, results report in Table 5 also show that the size of the informal 
economy affects negatively economic growth (Loayza, 2016; Afonso and Sarabanda, 2017). 
With regards to the control variables, their signs are consistent with standard growth 
regressions. 
Table 5 : Remittances, informal economy and  economic growth 
  Dependent variable : GDP per capita growth 
 OLS   GMM 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Remittances 0.246* 0.283***  0.0387*** 0.0804*** 
 (0.128) (0.0636)  (0.00681) (0.0203) 
Informal economy -0.981*** -1.048***  -0.0425 -0.0667 
 (0.244) (0.228)  (0.0313) (0.0598) 
Remittances*Informal economy  -0.0717***   -0.0590* 
  (0.0158)   (0.0325) 
Population growth -0.596*** -0.499***  -0.0202 -0.0963** 
 (0.104) (0.0990)  (0.0204) (0.0455) 
Inflation rate -0.0746 0.0132  -0.0843*** -0.0995*** 
 (0.130) (0.122)  (0.0114) (0.0138) 
Trade openness 0.359** 0.164  0.0554* 0.00693 
 (0.158) (0.162)  (0.0272) (0.0381) 
Financial development 0.135** 0.169***  0.0307*** 0.00932 
 (0.0612) (0.0303)  (0.00574) (0.0173) 
Government expenditure 0.0874 0.174  0.0607 0.0260 
 (0.186) (0.177)  (0.0411) (0.0563) 
Human capital  0.238   0.147 
  (0.226)   (0.104) 
L.(GDP per capita growth)    0.968*** 0.967*** 
    (0.0236) (0.0354) 
Constant 9.947*** 9.321***  9.911*** 10.04*** 
 (1.190) (1.421)  (3.763) (3.063) 
R-squared 0.542 0.610    
Observations 147 147  119 119 
Instruments    27 29 
Number of countries    30 30 
AR(1) test    0.0698 0.0566 
AR(2) test    0.257 0.381 
Hansen OIR       0.362 0.949 
Note. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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5. Conclusion 
Do remittances spur economic growth in Sub-Saharan African countries? How does the size of 
the informal economy influence the effects of remittances on economic growth? To answer 
these important economic questions, this paper investigates the relationship between 
remittances and economic growth using the annual data of 30 Sub-Saharan African countries 
over the period 1991–2015. It additionally examines whether the shadow economy influence 
the  positive  effects  of  remittances  on  economic  growth.  The  empirical  evidence  is  based  on  
ordinary Least Squared (OLS) and System Generalized Method of Moment (GMM). The results 
suggest that remittances have a highly statistically significant positive effect on economic 
growth. The positive impact of remittances on economic growth is quantitatively important and 
robust  to  the  inclusion  of  more  control  variables.  This  clearly  suggests  that  higher  level  of  
remittances leads to more economic growth. The interaction term between remittances and 
informal economy has a negative and significant influence on economic growth. This result 
suggests that a larger informal economy impede the effect of remittances on economic growth.  
We can draw the following policy implications from our results. Governments willing 
to benefit more from remittances in terms of economic growth should put in place policies that 
encourage and facilitate the transformation of informal activities into formal activities. Which 
would allow them to better control the transfers of remittances and to better profit from them. 
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Appendix 
Table 6 : Definitions of variables 
Variables  Variables Definition (measurement) Sources 
GDP per capita growth GDP per capita growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
Remittances  Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
Informal economy Informal economy (% of GDP) Medina and Schneider 
(2017) 
Government expenditure General government final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP)           
World Bank (WDI) 
Population Population growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
Trade openness Sum of exports and imports (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
Financial development Broad money (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
Human capital School enrollment, primary (% gross) World Bank (WDI) 
Inflation rate Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
Labor force participation  Labor force participation rate,  total  (% of  
total population ages 15-64) (modeled ILO 
estimate) 
World Bank (WDI) 
 
 
 
Corruption control 
A measure of corruption within the 
political system that is a threat to foreign 
investment by distorting the economic and 
financial environment, reducing the 
efficiency of government and business by 
enabling people to assume positions of 
power through patronage rather than 
ability, and introducing inherent instability 
into the political process 
 
 
 
ICRG 
 
 
Government stability 
A measure of both of the government’s 
ability to carry out its declared program(s), 
and its ability to stay in office. The risk 
rating  assigned  is  the  sum  of  three  
subcomponents: Government Unity, 
Legislative Strength, and Popular Support 
ICRG 
 
Table 7: List of countries (30) 
Angola   Guinea   Nigeria 
Botswana  Guinea-Bissau  Senegal 
Burkina Faso  Kenya  Sierra Leone 
Cameroon  Liberia  South Africa 
Congo, Rep  Madagascar  Sudan 
Côte d’Ivoire  Malawi  Tanzania 
Ethiopia  Mali  Togo 
Gabon  Mozambique  Uganda 
The Gambia  Namibia  Zambia 
Ghana   Niger   Zimbabwe 
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